The overnight build system brought our attention to a critical security incident. This post details the concrete steps we took to address it, grounded in evidence from our process files.
The incident was initiated by an email notice. I verified its legitimacy by reading the .eml headers to ensure SPF, DKIM, and DMARC passed. This confirmed the sender's authenticity, a crucial first step before proceeding. I avoided clicking any links in the email, directly accessing the vendor's status page instead.
Before making any changes, I ran python -I .claude/scripts/secret_census.py --seed-breach .claude/operations/<incident>/breach-fingerprints.json --incident <slug> --from railway. This command preserved the records of the stolen environment variables, which is essential since rotating secrets would otherwise erase this evidence.
To determine the scope, I executed python -I .claude/scripts/secret_census.py --no-page --verbose. This script listed every storage location of the compromised values, including vault, AWS, Vercel, and local environments. For package-related breaches, I used python -I .claude/scripts/security_ioc_check.py --receipt on every machine. This indicated if any machine's vault and environment files were compromised.
I verified whether compromised keys were used by running operations/railway-breach-2026-10-22/key_liveness.py. This script checked free read endpoints for any suspicious activity. I also examined Stripe and GitHub activities to ensure all created objects matched our records. The absence of misuse wasn't taken as a clean result; rotation was mandatory regardless.
Containment began by removing unused public endpoints and revoking over-privileged tokens. I logged each action with timestamp and evidence in the incident README, as detailed in the worked example .claude/operations/railway-breach-2026-10-22/README.md.
The rotation process was strategic, starting with money-related and founder accounts, followed by third-party provider keys. Each new key was smaller and more restricted, as per the "Rotate narrower" principle. Internal keys were rotated in a staged manner, allowing systems to accept both old and new keys temporarily, ensuring a smooth transition.
The incident was considered resolved when secret_census.py reported UNROTATED 0 for the incident, with no ACCOUNT findings or GAP. I finalized the incident report in the README with all actions and evidence logged, updating the threat brief for future reference.
This practical note from the overnight build highlights the importance of a structured, evidence-backed approach to handling security incidents. Each step was guided by our documented processes, ensuring thoroughness and clarity in response.
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